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Roth: Tort Liability for Bad Faith in Montana

NOTE

TORT LIABILITY FOR BAD FAITH IN MONTANA:
THE END OF THE STORY
William V. Roth*
[Tihe 'tort tail' has begun to wag the 'contractdog.'

-The Montana Supreme Court1
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1990, the Montana Supreme Court stemmed a 5-year rise
in bad faith tort claims for breach of commercial contracts. The
court's decision in Story v. City of Bozeman marked a turning

point in Montana's bad faith contract law. The Story court moved
away from applying the bad faith tort to all contracts by adding
a special relationship test.2 The court's decision in Story ended
Montana's controversial reign as the only state in the nation to
allow tort damages for a bad faith claim arising from a contract
between commercial parties dealing at arms length.3 Story signifies not only a return to traditional contract theory, but also the
court's attempt to redefine its contract law principles in the face
* Thanks to Christopher J. Flann, M. Scott Regan, and Jon 0. Shields for
much needed editorial assistance.
1. Story v. City of Bozeman, 242 Mont. 436, 445, 791 P.2d 767, 772 (1990).
2. See infra Parts III-IV for a discussion of the Story special relationship test
and its impact on Montana case law.
3. California, the state credited with developing the bad faith tort, never, in
its own estimation, applied the bad faith theory to contracts between commercial
parties to the extent that Montana did. Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co.,
900 P.2d 669, 677 (Cal. 1995). In Freeman & Mills, the California Supreme Court
overruled itself and forbade tort damages for breach of the covenant (and bad faith
denial of contract) outside of the insurer/insured context. Id. at 680. The court also
thoroughly discussed the evolution of bad faith contract denial in California case law
an overview
of the theory's
scholarly 1996
criticism. Id. at 674-79.
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of legislative action preempting the law governing contract disputes.4
This Note examines the Story decision and its impact on
claims for tortious bad faith in Montana from both a legal and
theoretical perspective. Part II begins the traditional casenote
component of this Note by describing Montana's development of
tort damages for bad faith. Part III examines the Story opinion
and analyzes its substantive changes to the elements of a bad
faith tort claim. Part IV concludes the legal analysis of Story by
summarizing the Montana Supreme Court's handling of postStory bad faith claims and emphasizes the pivotal role of the
Story special relationship test in subsequent bad faith suits.
Part V begins the theoretical component of this Note. The
first half compares the economic implications of the efficient
breach model for contract damages with tort liability for bad
faith. The second half considers legislative action banning tort
damages in certain contracts as a reaction in the political economy to the common law bad faith tort. Finally, Part VI brings
together the legal note and theoretical components of this Note.
It concludes that the Story special relationship test, in conjunction with statutory bans, effectively eliminates tort damages for
bad faith in Montana. In light of theoretical arguments, the final
part of this Note discusses the desirability of Montana's return
to the efficient breach doctrine of contract law and the need for
an impartial judiciary to shape a fair, but economically sound,
contract law.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Case Law Developments Before Story
In the United States, including Montana,5 courts traditionally follow the famous English decision of Hadley v. Baxendale
when awarding contract damages.6 In common law, Hadley
4. The tone of legislation covering related areas of the law might influence
judicial rulings. Judge Richard A. Posner stated that "[judge's rulings will reflect the]
original tenor of legislation ....

If judges did not decide questions of statutory

interpretation so, the independence of the judiciary would cease to perform an essential function . . . and might therefore be reduced by the legislature, with a concomitant loss of judicial power." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §
19.7, at 535 (4th ed. 1992). For similar reasons, the court might act to reshape its
common law where the legislature consistently acted to preempt the area.
5. Stovall v. Watt, 187 Mont. 439, 451-52, 610 P.2d 164, 171 (1980) (Sheehy,
J., dissenting); see also Story, 242 Mont. at 450-51, 791 P.2d at 776. Montana codified the Hadley rule for contract damages at MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-311 (1995).
6. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). The Montana Supreme Court dehttps://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol57/iss2/13
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stands for the rule that a non-breaching party's contract damages cannot exceed the value of the agreement lost as a result of
the breach, in addition to any other damages naturally flowing
from, and within contemplation of, the breaching party at the
time of contract.' Hadley damages compensate the non-breaching party's loss resulting from breach, but unlike tort damages,
serve no punitive role to deter parties from breaching. In fact,
traditional American jurisprudence permits a party to deliberately breach a contract if the party is willing to compensate the
other side for the value of the broken agreement.' Proponents of
Hadley justify the cap on damages precisely because it allows
parties the freedom to breach, an option which legal theorists
term "efficient breach."9 At least one legal historian, Professor
Richard Danzig, has argued that the Hadley court revolutionized
contract law by extending a special exception to tortious damages for contract breach.1 ° Professor Danzig believes that the English Court of Exchequer's decision to limit damages in contract
law reflected the impact of laissez-faire industrialism on
England's jurisprudence in 1854.
In America, the Hadley restriction on the size of damages
and the availability of efficient breach fit in well with our juris-

scribed the codification of the Hadley rule in Montana as follows:
The general rule of Hadley v. Baxendale . . . is embodied in our section 17301, R.C.M.1947, which provides that the measure of damages in a contract
breach is the amount which will compensate the party aggrieved for all the
detriment proximately caused thereby, or which, in the ordinary course of
things, would be likely to result therefrom.
Laas v. State Highway Comm., 157 Mont. 121, 131, 483 P.2d 699, 704 (1971).
7. The Hadley court set out the following rule:
Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the
damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of
contract should be such as fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach
of contract, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the
contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the
probable result of the breach of it.
Hadley, 9 Ex. at 354, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151.
8. See Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462
(1897) ("The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you
must pay damages if you do not keep it,-and nothing else.").
9. See POSNER, supra note 4, § 4.8, at 118-19.
10. Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A study in the Industrializationof the
Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 264-65 (1975) reprinted in RICHARD DANZIG, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAw 88-89 (1978) (describing the influence of a statutory limit for damages against common carriers on the Hadley court).
11. Id. at 259-60.
Published by ScholarWorks
at University of Montana, 1996
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prudential scheme 2 until courts recognized certain types of contract breach which offended traditional notions of fair play. The
limited scope of Hadley contract damages, by definition, did not
deter defendants from repeating these types of behavior which
courts found offensive. 3 The problem first manifested itself in
the area of insurance claims. Courts perceived an inability of
Hadley damages to deter insurance companies from refusing to
settle third-party insurance claims when settlement was clearly
in a policyholder's best interests." For example, an insurance
company might insist on litigating a claim filed against a policyholder which the third party claimant offered to settle for an
amount roughly equivalent to the policy cap. The insurance
company's tactics could lead to litigation which unnecessarily put
the policyholder at risk of having to pay the difference between a
large jury award and the cap on his or her policy coverage. If a
jury rendered a huge judgment against the policyholder, the
policyholder could look to the insurance company to cover no
more than the policy's cap on coverage. 5 Under Hadley, the policyholder could not recover the additional loss that the policyholder suffered because the insurance company refused to settle.
Realizing that traditional contract damages could not force them
to pay more than the value of the policy agreement, insurance
companies risked litigating suits knowing that they could only
lose by litigating what they had bargained to lose in the first
place: the value of the policy. Courts imposed punitive or other
tort damages on such insurance companies under the theory that
the insurance company had a fiduciary duty to not subject the
policyholder to the risk of a huge judicial award which the insurance company's insistence on litigation created. 6 The California

12. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 8, at 462.
13. See Sandra Chutorian, Note, Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract: The
Expansion of Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing into the Commercial Realm, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 377-78 (1986); see also
Glenn E. Tremper, Comment, Commercial Bad Faith: Tort Recovery for Breach of Implied Covenant in Ordinary Commercial Contracts, 48 MONT. L. REv. 349, 374 (1987).
14.
Chutorian, supra note 13, at 382.
15. See Kerry L. Macintosh, Gilmore Spoke Too Soon: Contract Rises from the
Ashes of the Bad Faith Tort, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 483, 530 (1994).
16. The above explanation of the bad faith tort's emergence relies on Chutorian,
supra note 13, at 381-90 and Macintosh, supra note 15, at 487-515. This Note, as
with much of the discussion on tortious contract damages, uses the term tort damages to signify emotional or mental stress damages as well as punitive damages. It
does not, however, distinguish between compensatory and punitive tort damages
because the economic impact on the defendant of any award for contract breach
above the value of the bargain is economically the same. See POSNER, supra note 4,
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol57/iss2/13
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Supreme Court modified a pre-existing action, the bad faith
claim, to provide a mechanism for imposing tort damages on
insurance companies that refused to settle third-party claims on
behalf of policyholders." The court intended that the economic
impact of the tort damages discourage insurance companies from
litigating claims by making out-of-court settlement the cheapest
solution for insurance companies and policyholders alike. 8
The action which the court used, the bad faith claim, was
not originally a tort; it was a type of contract action. Traditionally, contract actions required breach of an express term in the
agreement to bring suit; but sometimes parties were denied the
benefits of a contract by a counterpart who engaged in behavior
that, while harmful, did not violate any express term. 9 In such
cases, California courts, as elsewhere in the country, recognized
a bad faith claim as a substitute for normal breach of contract.
The bad faith claim was a catch-all action that provided a plaintiff with a remedy when the other party's actions violated the
spirit of the contract without breaching its written terms. As a
matter of public policy, courts implied a covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in every contract and ruled that various actions
such as "[e]vading the spirit of the deal, slacking off, willful
breach, abuse of discretion, failure to cooperate, [and] adopting
an overreaching interpretation of the contract" violated the covenant.2" Thus, bad faith, or breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, existed originally as a catch-all contract action for which a plaintiff could only recover traditional
contract damages.
The California Supreme Court grafted tort damages to the
bad faith claim to create a disincentive to some types of contract
breach such as oppression of policyholders by insurance companies that refused to settle third-party claims.2 ' The type of activity targeted by the bad faith tort is, however, similar to the
kinds of bad faith conduct described above. An insurance company which litigated a third-party claim brought against a policy-

§ 16.5, at 209-10 (arguing either punitive or restitutionary damages can deter intentional torts).
17.
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 177 (1967).
18. Id. at 178. Conversely, if the court only awarded compensatory contract
damages, i.e. the value of the policy, insurance companies would have no
counterincentive to risking their policyholders' fates to the wheels of justice. Id. at
177.
19.
Macintosh, supra note 15, at 486-87.
20. Id. at 486.
21. Crisci, 426 P.2d at 176-78.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1996
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holder did not violate the terms of the policy by doing so and
refusing to settle. Because the insurance company's refusal to
settle the claim exposed the policyholder to unnecessary financial
risk, however, the insurance company's actions violated the spirit
of the policy. An insurance company's refusal to settle a claim,
thus, undermines the very purpose of buying insurance-protection against pecuniary loss-and falls within the
traditional definition of bad faith. But, the California court's tort
award for bad faith went further than compensation. The court
awarded tort damages to punish insurance companies for not
protecting policyholders and to deter other insurance companies
from repeating the offensive behavior towards holders of their
policies.22 California's experiment caught on. Courts nationwide
came to recognize the availability of tort damages in the thirdparty-insurance-claim context to prevent insurance companies
from abusing their policyholders.23
In the 1970s, California embarked on an expansion of its
bad faith tort to include several other types of contracts which,
like insurance agreements, are characterized by one party's
stronger bargaining position.24 In such contracts, California's
judiciary posited that the weaker party's reliance on the benefits
of the contract created a quasi-fiduciary relationship between the
parties.25 California found that where the stronger party did not
execute the contract in good faith, it violated a duty towards the
weaker party for which tort damages were appropriate. 6 The
California courts awarded tort damages against insurance companies that failed to pay their policyholders' claims (i.e., firstparty policyholder claims as opposed to the third-party claims
discussed above),27 banks that misappropriated clients' funds,28
and employers who abused their unequal bargaining position vis-

22. See Macintosh, supra note 15, at 518-19 (explaining need for tort damages
in insurance context).
23. See Chutorian, supra note 13, at 382; Macintosh, supra note 15, at 489-90.
24. See Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158,
1166 (Cal. 1984) (listing bad faith suits in various contractual contexts).
25. See Chutorian, supra note 13, at 392.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 382-84 & n.32 (discussing Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d
1032, 1037 (Cal. 1973)). According to one author, 36 states recognize the tort of bad
faith in the first party/insurer context. Steven B. Fillman, Note, Braesch v. Union
Insurance Co., 237 Neb. 44, 464 N.W.2d 769 (1991) Policy Rationales of the Bad
Faith Cause of Action and Implications to Non-Insurance Commercial Contracts, 72
NEB. L. REv. 608, 609 (1993).
28. Macintosh, supra note 15, at 506 (discussing Commercial Cotton Co. v.
United Cal. Bank, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol57/iss2/13
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a-vis employees.2 9 However, California stopped just short of recognizing the bad faith tort in all commercial contract disputes.3"
In 1984, California's supreme court held that tort liability for
bad faith did not normally arise in commercial contracts, but a
party's bad faith denial of the existence of a contract between the
parties could rise to the level of tort.3 1
Where California halted, Montana carried on. Montana
courts applied the bad faith tort to the same types of insurance,
employment, and banking contracts as California.3 2 Montana
then went a step further, extending the bad faith tort claim to
all types of commercial breach.3 3 The Montana Supreme Court
handed down this landmark decision in Nicholson v. United
34
Pacific Insurance Co.
B. The Nicholson Precedentfor Tort Damages in Contracts
The 1985 Nicholson decision opened up a new realm of contract liability for the bad faith tort.' The Nicholson court
awarded the plaintiff, Nicholson, bad faith tort damages because,
despite the commercial nature of the deal, the defendant acted

29. Chutorian, supra note 13, at 384-86; Macintosh, supra note 15, at 490-91
(discussing Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980)).
30. Seaman's, 686 P.2d at 1167.
31. Id.
32. See Story, 242 Mont. at 447, 791 P.2d at 773 (listing non-commercial Montana bad faith tort cases). For insurance cases, see, e.g.:
(1) Britton v. Farmers Ins. Group, 221 Mont. 67, 72, 721 P.2d 303, 306 (1986);
(2) Klaudt v. Flink, 202 Mont. 247, 252, 658 P.2d 1065, 1067 (1983); (3) Fode v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 221 Mont. 282, 286, 719 P.2d 414, 416 (1986); and (4) First Sec.
Bank v. Goddard, 181 Mont. 407, 420, 593 P.2d 1040, 1047 (1979).
For employer cases, see, e.g.:
(1) Dare v. Montana Petro. Mktg. Co., 212 Mont. 274, 282, 687 P.2d 1015,
1020 (1984); and (2) Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 205 Mont. 304, 306-07, 668 P.2d
213, 214-15 (1983).
For banking cases, see, e.g.:
(1) Tribby v. Northwestern Bank, 217 Mont. 196, 211-12, 704 P.2d 409, 419
(1985); and (2) First Nat'l. Bank v. Twombly, 213 Mont. 66, 73, 689 P.2d 1226, 1230
(1984).
33.
See Tremper, supra note 13, at 352; see also Jim Hubble, Survey: Good
Faith and Fair Dealing: An Analysis of Recent Cases, 48 MONT. L. REV. 193 (1987).
34. 219 Mont. 32, 710 P.2d 1342 (1985).
35. Tremper, supra note 13, at 349. The Nicholson court stated that tort damages do not apply to all types of bad faith; however, the case law shows no discernible pattern of its refusal to hear a tortious bad faith claim before Story. Nicholson,
219 Mont. at 41, 710 P.2d at 1348; see also infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
But see Story, 242 Mont. at 449, 791 P.2d at 774-75 (discussing the Montana Supreme Court's attempts at defining the parameters of the bad faith action).
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outrageously in its breach of the agreement.36 The defendant,
United Pacific Insurance Co. (UPI), had commissioned a secret
task force that recommended transferring UPI's Helena operations to Salt Lake City. The recommendation obviated UPI's
need to rent plaintiff Nicholson's Helena office, which Nicholson
had promised to renovate according to UPI's specifications.37
Nicholson argued successfully that UPI stonewalled him by refusing to agree on renovation plans to force Nicholson to breach
the lease.38 A jury awarded Nicholson tortious damages because
UPI's malicious39 actions breached the covenant.4 ° The Montana Supreme Court, in upholding tort damages for breach of the
covenant, further explained the theory:
The nature and extent of an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is measured in a particular contract
by the justifiable expectations of the parties. Where one
party acts arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably, that
conduct exceeds the justifiable expectations of the second
party. The second party then should be compensated for
damages resulting from the other's culpable conduct.4

Nicholson requires a plaintiff to prove (a) the plaintiffs "reasonable expectations" and (b) the defendant's failure to meet
them.42 The Nicholson standard which was highly subjective
and easy to meet became the basis for a wide expansion of tort
liability in contract actions. 4 Plaintiff lawyers embraced the
standard as a gateway to lucrative tort damages," while critics
warned that the imposition of tort liability on contract law would
blur a traditional legal distinction maintained to allow efficient
36. Nicholson, the lessor, persuaded UPI to move its Helena office into his
building. The parties negotiated a lease conditioned upon Nicholson's renovating the
office space to UPI's satisfaction. The parties disputed the interpretation of the renovation plans. Nicholson made consistent efforts to contact UPI officials to discuss and
approve proposals for the ongoing renovations, but met antagonism and delay. Finally, UPI rescinded the contract three days before Nicholson promised to complete the
renovations and after Nicholson spent $91,783 in remodeling costs. Nicholson filed a
complaint requesting specific performance, compensatory damages, and punitive damages for breach of the covenant. Nicholson, 219 Mont. at 34-35, 710 P.2d at 1343-44.
37. Id. at 34, 710 P.2d at 1344.
38. Id. at 35-36, 710 P.2d at 1344-45.
39. Nicholson had the added burden of meeting MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221
(1995). The statute requires proof of oppression, fraud, or malice if the claim requests punitive damages. Nicholson, 219 Mont. at 42, 710 P.2d at 1348-49.
40. Id, at 36, 710 P.2d at 1345.
41. Id. at 41-42, 710 P.2d at 1348.
42. Story, 242 Mont. at 447-48, 791 P.2d at 774.
43. See infra notes 46-47.
44. See Story, 242 Mont. at 449, 791 P.2d at 774.
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breach.' In fact, the Nicholson decision initiated a growth of
tortious bad faith claims in Montana that added economic risk
for contracting parties.
C. The Expansion of Tortious Bad Faith Claims after Nicholson
In the late 1980s, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed tort
damages, including punitive and emotional damages, for commercial bad faith claims in accord with Nicholson." At least
nine times from 1985 to 1990, the Montana Supreme Court refused to reject a tortious bad faith claim. The supreme court affirmed bad faith tort damages five times and remanded four
additional cases without invalidating the claims.4 7 The bad faith
tort's rise attracted the attention of the Montana Legislature,
which passed laws in 1987 to prohibit tort damages for bad faith
claims in employment and insurance contracts." The legislative
history of both bills indicates that business interests lobbied
hard for the changes.49 Plaintiffs could have continued to claim
bad faith in other areas, but the Story court effectively overruled
Nicholson in 1990.50
45. Tremper, supra note 13, at 350.
46. E.g., First Sec. Bank v. Gary, 245 Mont. 394, 798 P.2d 523 (1990) (holding
bank acted in bad faith by forcing loan client to hire bad-risk construction company);
Dunfee v. Baskin-Robbins, Inc., 221 Mont. 447, 720 P.2d 1148 (1986) (approving
punitive bad faith damages where franchisor refused to allow franchisee to move to
better location).
47. The court affirmed the bad faith tort in: Bottrell v. American Bank, 237
Mont. 1, 773 P.2d 694 (1989); Weinberg v. Farmers State Bank, 231 Mont. 10, 752
P.2d 719 (1988); Tynes v. Bankers Life Co., 224 Mont. 350, 730 P.2d 1115 (1987);
Dunfee v. Baskin-Robbins, Inc., 221 Mont. 447, 720 P.2d 1148 (1986); Nicholson v.
United Pacific Ins. Co., 219 Mont. 32, 710 P.2d 1342 (1985). The court remanded in:
First Sec. Bank v. Gary, 245 Mont. 394, 798 P.2d 523 (1990); Zeke's Distrib. Co. v.
Brown-Forman Corp., 239 Mont. 272, 779 P.2d 908 (1989) (affirmed, but granted
defendants new trial); Hobbs v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, 236 Mont. 503, 771 P.2d
125 (1989); Noonan v. First Bank Butte, 227 Mont. 329, 740 P.2d 631 (1987).
48. In 1987, the legislature passed the Wrongful Discharge from Employment
Act and the Unfair Trade Practices Act for insurance regulation. The former bans
common law bad faith claims for wrongful discharge and the latter forbids any bad
faith claims arising from an insurance company's handling of a policy claim. The
Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act states: "Preemption of common-law remedies. Except as provided in this part, no claim for discharge may arise from tort or
express or implied contract." MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-913 (1995).
The Unfair Trade Practices Act for insurance is even more explicit: "An insured may not bring an action for bad faith in connection with the handling of an
insurance claim." MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-242(3) (1995).
49. See notes 201-211 and accompanying text for further discussion of the lobbying efforts by insurance companies and Montana employers as found in the 1987
minutes of house and senate committee hearings.
50. See Story, 242 Mont. at 458, 791 P.2d at 780 (Sheehy, J., dissenting) (stat-
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III. STORY V. CITY OF BOZEMAN 51

A. The Facts and Trial
The Montana Supreme Court heard four separate appeals
arising from a water main contract between Mark Story (Story),
a construction contractor, and the City of Bozeman (City).5" In
1990, the City brought the first appeal, asking the court to overturn a damage award for contract breach and bad faith damages
in favor of the plaintiff, Story. The court opinion described a
litany of problems and complaints arising from delays in Story's
installation of the City's water mains."s Midway through construction, the City's engineer wrote to Story's surety complaining
that Story was not completing his jobs on schedule. The bonding
company terminated Story's bond, and Story cancelled the contract.' Story brought suit alleging that the City breached the
contract, acted in bad faith, and defamed Story in the letter
written to the surety. The City counterclaimed for reformation
and breach of contract."
At trial, the jury found that the contract contained a mutual

ing that majority's goal in Story was to reverse Nicholson). But see id. at 450, 791
P.2d at 775 (majority holding that the Nicholson reasoning was still sound).
51. 242 Mont. 436, 791 P.2d 767 (1990).
52. The four appeals are the following:
(1) Story v. City of Bozeman, 242 Mont. 436, 791 P.2d 767 (1990); (2) City of
Bozeman v. AIU Ins. Co., 262 Mont. 370, 865 P.2d 268 (1993) (dispute over AIU's
obligation to represent the City in Story's suit); (3) Story v. City of Bozeman, 259
Mont. at 207, 856 P.2d 202 (1993) (Story I/); (4) City of Bozeman v. AIU Ins. Co.,
272 Mont. 349, 900 P.2d 929 (1995). This note deals mainly with the 1990 Story
decision in which the Montana Supreme Court set out new guidelines for bad faith
claims.
53. First, the City's bid schedule form contained a typographical error which
asked for the bidder's price on 120 cubic feet (C.F.) of pipe bedding material. The
City intended to collect bids on cubic yards (C.Y.), but the sheet erroneously specified
C.F. All contractors except Story bid assuming yards. Story gave the lowest bid in
part because his bid reflected the lower cost of only 120 cubic feet of pipe bedding
material. The City argued that Story knew of the typo, bid at a cubic yard rate, and
then used the typo to demand extra payment. Story countered that the City's engineer refused bad weather extensions to coerce him into accepting the City's position
on the pipe bedding materials. Story, 242 Mont. at 439-40, 791 P.2d at 769. Second,
the City accused Story of shoddy work that needed to be redone. Story replied that
the City failed to provide appropriate benchmarks. Third, the City accused Story of
moving his team off the job to do other work. Story insisted that wet conditions
prevented his team from working in Bozeman, so he moved them temporarily to
another site. Finally, the City accused Story's workers of trespassing upon and damaging landowners' property while on the job. Story argued that work easements provided by the City were too narrow for the job. Id. at 440, 791 P.2d at 769.
54. Id. at 440, 791 P.2d at 769.
55. Id.
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mistake, that the parties acquiesced in the mistake, and that the
contract should be reformed. 6 The jury rejected the City's
claims, but awarded Story $13,236 in contract damages for an
unspecified breach of the contract and $360,000 in tort damages
for the City's bad faith.57 The City appealed on two issues: (1)
whether the trial court erred by not granting defendant a new
trial because the special verdict form was inadequate;" and (2)
whether
bad faith in a contract action gave rise to tort damag59
es.
B. The Holding
The Story court reaffirmed Montana's implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, but qualified the circumstances in
which the covenant operates. The Story court held that every
contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. 0 The court defined the standard of compliance to be
"honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade."6 ' For most contracts, the
court held that a breach of the covenant is merely a breach of
the contract to which only Hadley contract damages are available. 2 Under exceptional circumstances, the court held that a
plaintiff could win tort damages for bad faith by proving the

56. Id. at 440-41, 791 P.2d at 769-70.
57. Story, 242 Mont. at 439, 791 P.2d at 769.
58. Id. On the jury instruction issue, the Montana Supreme Court held that the
special verdict form failed to state the law and presented the issues in an inconsistent, confusing, and misleading fashion. Id. at 445, 791 P.2d at 772. The issue is not
dealt with further in this Note.
59. Id. at 439, 791 P.2d at 769.
60. Id. at 450, 791 P.2d at 775. The court added that "breach of an express
contractual term is not a prerequisite to breach of the implied covenant." Story, 242
Mont. at 450, 791 P.2d at 775.
61. Id. The court added that the above standard was identical to that applied
under the UCC to merchants. The court explained the standard, found at section 281-211 of the Montana Code, as follows:
Each party to a contract has a justified expectation that the other will act
in a reasonable manner in its performance or efficient breach. When one
party uses discretion conferred by the contract to act dishonestly or to act
outside of accepted commercial practices to deprive the other party of the
benefit of the contract, the contract is breached.
Story 242 Mont. at 450, 791 P.2d at 775 (interpreting MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-1-211
(1995)). The new standard supplants the Nicholson standard of "justified expectations
of the parties created by their particular contractual relationship" by redefining the
parameters of "justified expectations." Compare Story, 242 Mont. at 450, 791 P.2d at
775 with Nicholson, 219 Mont. at 42, 710 P.2d at 1348-49.
62. Story, 242 Mont. at 450-51, 791 P.2d at 775-76.
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existence of a special relationship between the parties."
C. The Court's Reasoning
The court based its holdings on an analysis of the problems
associated with the bad faith tort's development in Montana.'
The court identified four areas, which, taken as a whole, demonstrated
the need for a mid-course correction in the bad faith
65
tort.
First, the court pointed out that tort damages awarded in
contract cases disrupt the doctrine of efficient breach. 6' The Story court recognized that obtaining compensation from a breaching party is rarely efficient, but found that contract provisions
for court costs and attorney's fees better allow a prevailing party
to recoup the transaction costs of adjudication.6 7 The court,
therefore, concluded that the specter of tort damages unnecessarily interferes with a party's freedom to breach a contract and pay
contract damages whenever performance is not efficient.68
Second, the court reasoned that adding a tort action for bad
faith expanded the scope of allowable evidence far beyond that of
traditional contract issues.6 9 The court concluded that evidence
brought
to prove wrongdoing and intent might prejudice a ju70
ry.

Third, the court pointed to its own role in developing the bad
faith tort in Montana.7 1 Throughout the tort's eleven-year history, the court had continuously redefined and rechanneled the
bad faith tort's application in an effort to prevent its overuse by
plaintiffs.7 2
Finally, the court took judicial notice of legislative action to
curb the application of bad faith tort for employee discharge, to
ban non-Hadley damages in other areas of contract law, and to

63. Id. at 450, 791 P.2d at 775. See infra note 83 and accompanying text for
the California special relationship test adopted in Story. The court also noted that
the independent tort actions of fraud, fraudulent inducement, and tortious interference with contract exist to remedy the oppressive or malicious acts of contract parties. Story, 242 Mont. at 451, 791 P.2d at 776.
64. Id. at 445, 791 P.2d at 772.

65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 448, 791 P.2d at 774.
Id.

68.
69.

Story, 242 Mont. at 448, 791 P.2d at 774.
Id.

70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id at 458-59, 791 p.2d at 774-75.
Id
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redefine the standard of compliance for the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, as evidence of public dissatisfaction
with expanded tort liability in Montana.73 Combined, the above
concerns persuaded the court to redefine bad faith and limit the
availability of tort damages for it.74
D. Analysis of the Story Opinion
The Story court reworked the bad faith action by adopting
three broad changes. First, the court bifurcated bad faith into
separate tort and contract claims. Second, the court changed the
evidentiary standard for claiming bad faith. Third, the Story
court established a special relationship test as a prerequisite for
allowing a bad faith claim to sound in tort.
Story splits bad faith into a contract action and a tort action,
but includes the same elements in each with the exception of the
special relationship for tort treated below. As indicated earlier,
the standard of conduct for good faith and fair dealing is implied
into every contract as a covenant.75 Under Story, a trial judge
treats the covenant's breach the same as breach of an express
contract term.76 The contract action for bad faith arises from
breach of this implied covenant. In most instances, the court
envisions that contract damages awarded for breach of the covenant will adequately compensate a plaintiff. However, Story also
retains the availability of Nicholson-style bad faith tort damages
for egregious situations where normal contract damages will not
suffice. The tort action shares the same standard of good faith
and fair dealing that applies to the contract claim. If the plaintiff
can establish a special relationship between the parties, the
standard of good faith changes from a covenant to a duty owed
by the defendant to the plaintiff.77 A plaintiff is entitled to tort
damages by proving that the defendant breached the duty of
good faith and fair dealing arising from the special relationship.
Regardless of whether a covenant or duty is at issue, the
defendant's conduct must violate the same good faith standard
outlined below.
As the bad faith action's standard of compliance, the court
adopted the legislature's UCC model of good faith and fair deal-

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Story, 242 Mont. at 449, 791 P.2d at 775.
Id.
Id. at 450, 791 P.2d at 775.
Id.
Id. at 451-52, 791 P.2d at 776.
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ing for merchants, including the UCC "reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade" for evaluating compliance
with the covenant. 7' The UCC standard replaced Nicholson's

subjective "reasonable expectation" standard by substantively
redefining it.79 Under Story's UCC standard, the plaintiff must
(a) establish the commercial standards of the trade through
expert testimony, and (b) show that the defendant's conduct exceeded the standards of a trade which might normally allow
reasonably dishonest conduct."0 Compared to Nicholson, Story
raises the evidentiary burden for all bad faith claims.8 "
For the tort claim, the Story court added another burden, a
special relationship test. The Story court concluded that a tort
award is appropriate only when the law must discourage a stronger contracting party from oppressing a weaker counterpart. The
court restricted the bad faith tort's use to such situations by
requiring the plaintiff to establish a quasi-fiduciary relationship
between the parties. 2 The test serves as a mechanism for discriminating between contracts for which tort damages are appropriate and those for which only contract damages are due. The
Story special relationship test provides:
(1) the contract must be such that the parties are in
inherently unequal bargaining positions; [and] (2) the
motivation for entering the contract must be a nonprofit motivation, i.e., to secure peace of mind, security, future protection; [and] (3) ordinary contract damages are not adequate because (a) they do not require
the party in the superior position to account for its
actions, and (b) they do not make the inferior party
'whole'; [and] (4) one party is especially vulnerable
because of the type of harm it may suffer and of
necessity places trust in the other party to perform;
and (5) the other party is aware of this vulnerabili-

78. Story, 242 Mont. at 449-50, 791 P.2d at 775.
79. Id.; see also supra note 61 (explaining how Story redefined Nicholson's "justiffied expectations" standard).
80. See Story, 242 Mont. at 450-51, 791 P.2d at 775-76.
81. Of course, the standards set out in Story do not affect contracts that fall
within one of the areas governed by statute such as the UCC statutes for the sale of
goods between merchants and the sale of goods for non-merchants. Id. at 450, 791
P.2d at 775.
82. Id. at 451, 791 P.2d at 776 (concluding that the tort of bad faith "serves to
discourage oppression in contracts which necessarily give one party a superior position"). Many of these exceptions are precluded by the 1987 laws. Id.; see also infra
notes 185-90 and accompanying text.
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The test sets out the indicia of a quasi-fiduciary relationship.
The first element of the test defines parties bargaining from a
position of power as the class whose bad faith can rise to the
level of tort. The second element excludes from that class parties
motivated by profit-such as arms-length commercial parties.'
The third element qualifies the class of powerful parties to those
who can impose harm beyond the mere value of the contract on a
weaker party and who deserve the extra deterrence of tort
awards to prevent such breach. The fourth element further narrows the definition of the weaker party to be only those especially vulnerable to the harm of the stronger party's breach. The
fifth element provides a safe harbor for some defendants similar
to the Hadley requirement that damages flowing from the breach
be within the contemplation of the breaching party at the time of
contract. The last element would place the parties outside of a
special relationship, if a defendant could prove ignorance of the
plaintiffs vulnerability to harm from breach.
The criteria as adapted from California case law create a
high standard.85 The Story court's inclusion of the bracketed
conjunctions underscores the need for a plaintiff to show every
element of the special relationship. A prima facie claim of tortious bad faith must survive the judge's scrutiny for a special
relationship between the parties meeting the test, or the claim
will not go before the jury. 6
The court took no stance as to whether Story and the City
shared a special relationship, but Justice Sheehy's dissent accused the majority of altering the elements of tortious bad faith

83. Story, 242 Mont. at 451, 792 P.2d at 776 (citing Wallis v. Superior Court,
207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 129 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)) (brackets in original).
84. Most likely, the second element excludes powerful parties from extracting
special relationship damages from weaker contract partners because such stronger
parties will enter into the contract to earn a profit.
85. Wallis, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129 (holding that the test serves as a predicate to

tort liability).
86. Story, 242 Mont. 451, 791 P.2d at 776. The Story court pointed out bad
faith claims expose the jury to evidence of issues beyond the scope of traditional
contract action. Id. at 448, 791 P.2d at 774. Where bad faith and breach claims are
tried together, the bad faith claim may poison the jury's minds as to the breach
claim by introducing evidence of bad intent and wrongdoing. Id. The Story special
relationship renders the issue moot because the tort bad faith claim will almost
always fail to reach the jury. However, if the plaintiff offers evidence in support of
each element of the special relationship and the defendant presents controverting
evidence as to any of the elements, the jury must decide the material issues. Id. at
451, 791 P.2d at 776.
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to preclude tort damages in any contract dispute. 7 The dissent
predicted that Story would lose his tort award on remand," and
in fact, Story dropped his bad faith claim at retrial.8 9 Despite
his loss of the bad faith tort claim, however, Story won $850,000
on remand in large part because he presented expert testimony
on issues such as future lost profits and loss of credit and reputation.9"
Nonetheless, Justice Sheehy's dissent accurately predicts the
fate of commercial bad faith tort claims after Story. Case law
shows that the court has consistently denied bad faith tort
claims; the primary reason offered by the court is an absence of a
special relationship because the parties entered into the agreement motivated by profit. The discussion below focuses on how
the test's second element, excluding parties motivated by profit,
seems to disqualify commercial parties in particular from meeting the Story special relationship.
IV. THE IMPACT OF STORY

A. Empirical Evidence of the End of the Bad Faith Tort
Post-Story case law confirms that the court made an aboutface on tortious bad faith. In the five years after Story, the court
rejected tort damages for every commercial bad faith claim contested on appeal.9 1 Tort claims failed twelve times because the
court denied the existence of a Story special relationship between
the commercial parties.9 2 The following three examples illus-

87. Id. at 461, 791 P.2d at 782 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
88. Id.
89. Story 1I, 259 Mont. at 215, 856 P.2d at 206-07.
90. Id. at 215, 856 P.2d at 207.
91. Cases against lending institutions are included in the analysis. Although the
Montana Supreme Court recognized the bad faith tort's use against banks before
Nicholson, the Story special relationship governs bad faith tort claims against banking and other financial institutions. See infra notes 214-215 for pre-Nicholson and
post-Story bad faith cases involving lending institutions.
92. Listed by type of contract-(1) General Contract: Trad Indust., Ltd. v. Brogan, 246 Mont. 439, 805 P.2d 54 (1991); Keller v. Dooling, 248 Mont. 535, 813 P.2d
437 (1991); Daniels v. Dean, 253 Mont. 465, 833 P.2d 1078 (1992); Haines Pipeline
Constr., Inc. v, Montana Power Co., 251 Mont. 422, 830 P.2d 1230 (1991);
Beaverhead Bar Supply, Inc. v. Harrington, 247 Mont. 117, 805 P.2d 560 (1991); (2)
Employee Contract: Marshall v. State, 253 Mont. 23, 830 P.2d 1250 (1992);
Kinniburgh v. Garrity, 244 Mont. 350, 798 P.2d 102 (1990); (3) financial agreements:
Citizens First Natl Bank v. Moe Motor Co., 248 Mont. 495, 813 P.2d 400 (1991);
Richland Nat'l Bank & Trust v. B & J Drilling, 249 Mont. 410, 816 P.2d 1045
(1991); First Sec. Bank & Trust v. VZ Ranch, 247 Mont. 453, 807 P.2d 1341 (1991);
Lachenmaier v. First Bank Systems, Inc., 246 Mont. 26, 803 P.2d 614 (1990); (4)

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol57/iss2/13

16

Roth: Tort Liability for Bad Faith in Montana

1996]

THE BAD FAITH TORT IN MONTANA

583

trate how the court has used the Story test to preclude tort liability in commercial bad faith claims.
B. No Special Relationship in Commercial Contracts
In Haines Pipeline Construction, Inc. v. Montana Power
Co., 93 Montana Power Co. (MPC) entered into a contract with

Haines Pipeline Construction, Inc. (Haines) to install a gas pipeline.94 Haines posted a $750,000 irrevocable letter of credit in
lieu of a construction bond.95 After on-site inspection by MPC,
Haines buried the pipeline.9" After discovering problems with
the pipeline, MPC hired agents including Haines to dig up sections of pipe for repair work.9" Despite reassurances to the contrary, MPC drew upon Haines' letter of credit to help cover the
repair costs.98 The district court ruled that MPC took various
actions prior to approval of the pipeline and subsequent to repair
negotiations that estopped MPC from holding Haines financially
responsible for the pipeline problems.99 The supreme court affirmed the district court's $502,361 award for breach of contract,' °° but denied Haines a $1,000,000 punitive bad faith tort
award because even Haines did not dispute the absence of a
Story special relationship between the litigants.'0 ' Justice
Trieweiler stated in his dissent that Haines exemplified the type
of oppression against small businesspersons for which, due to
Story, the bad faith tort no longer afforded protection.'
In Trad Industries, Ltd. v. Brogan, °3 the plaintiff (Trad)
sued Brogran, the owner of a game farm, for failure to deliver
domesticated elk per a sale agreement between the parties.'0 4
The court held that Brogan failed to show impossibility of performing his contractual obligations and that Brogan breached
the sales agreement.10'5 The court upheld the trial court's refus-

Insurance Policy: McNeil v. Currie, 253 Mont. 9, 830 P.2d 1241 (1992).
93.
251 Mont. 422, 830 P.2d 1230 (1991).
94. Haines Pipeline, 251 Mont. at 424, 830 P.2d at 1232.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 425, 830 P.2d at 1232-33.
98. Id. at 426, 830 P.2d at 1233.
99. Haines Pipeline, 251 Mont. at 426, 830 P.2d at 1233.
100. Id. at 431, 830 P.2d at 1236.
101.
Id. at 434, 830 P.2d at 1238.
102.
Id. at 437, 830 P.2d at 1240 (Trieweiler, J. dissenting).
103. 246 Mont. 439, 805 P.2d 54 (1991).
104. Trad Industries, 247 Mont. at 442-43, 805 P.2d at 56-57.
105. Id. at 446-48, 805 P.2d at 59-60.
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al of exemplary damages, reasoning that, even if Trad proved
bad faith,
Trad could never establish the Story special relation06
ship.
Finally, in Beaverhead Bar Supply, Inc. v. Harrington,"
the trial court granted summary judgement in favor of
Harrington where no written contract existed to show that
Harrington, a supplier, had agreed to supply Beaverhead Bar
Supply, Inc. (Beaverhead) with Pepsi products.0 8 The supreme
court overruled, holding summary judgment improper because a
material dispute existed as to whether Harrington had orally
agreed to supply Beaverhead."° Remanding all other issues,
the supreme court foreclosed bad faith tort damages because the
parties entered into the supply agreement motivated by profit.110
Haines, Trad Indus. ltd., and Beaverhead Bar Supply, Inc.
show three commercial contexts-a pipeline construction contract, a sale of goods between small merchants, and an oral service agreement-where failure to meet the Story special relationship test precluded bad faith tort damages. Haines and
Beaverhead Bar Supply, Inc. are particularly informative. In
those cases, the trial court originally awarded bad faith tort
damages under the old Nicholson bad faith standard, while on
appeal the supreme court disallowed the tort claim under Story.
For instance, in Haines, like Nicholson, the trial court awarded
bad faith damages because the defendant engaged in oppressive
conduct by misleading the plaintiff.' The Haines facts do not
appear any less egregious than Nicholson, but unlike Nicholson,
the Haines tort claim failed on appeal because the plaintiff did
not meet the stringent standards of the Story special relationship test." Haines demonstrates that the Story test, not sympathetic facts, presently determines the outcome of bad faith tort
claims.

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 449-50, 805 P.2d at 60-61.
247 Mont. 117, 805 P.2d 560 (1991).
Beaverhead Bar Supply, 247 Mont. at 120, 805 P.2d at 561.
Id. at 120, 805 P.2d at 562.
Id. at 124, 805 P.2d at 564.
Haines Pipeline, 251 Mont. at 428-29, 830 P.2d at 1234.
Id. at 434, 830 P.2d at 1238.
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C. Impact on the FederalCourts
In the federal courts, Story dramatically curtailed bad faith
tort claims as well."' For example, federal lending programs
for housing and farming inevitably lead to foreclosures against
borrowers in Montana as in other parts of the country. In Montana, the pre-Story bad faith claim allowed borrowers to attack
foreclosures in federal court"" because the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA) transfers exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts
for all civil tort suits arising under state law if the suit names
the federal government or one of its agencies as a defendant." 5
Before Story, a Montana plaintiff could sue a federal lending
institution in federal court by bringing suit under Montana's bad
faith tort law." 6 After Story, the bad faith tort claim must pass
the federal court's application of the special relationship test. In
every post-Story case, the absence of a special relationship between a government lender and the borrower has precluded a
bad faith tort claim and consequently, federal jurisdiction under
FTCA. For example, in Winchell v. United States Department of
Agriculture,"' a farmer borrowed from a government lending
institution. The federal court ruled out a special relationship due8
to the profit motive of the contract and dismissed the case."
113. No federal case citing Story found tortious bad faith. See Knerr v. Federal
Land Bank, 1991 WL 22119 (9th Cir. Feb. 25, 1991) (unpublished); Shupak v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 780 F. Supp. 1328 (D. Mont. 1991); Peterson v. Blue Chip Cookies Franch. Corp., 1991 WL 142615 (9th Cir. July 29, 1991) (unpublished);
Pennington's Inc. v. Brown-Foreman Corp., 785 F.Supp 1412 (D. Mont. 1991);
Winchell v. United States Dep't of Agric., 961 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1992); Fitzgerald
v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 1992 WL 280976 (9th Cir. Oct. 14, 1992) (unpublished); Plaza West Dental Group v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 1992 WL
280979 (9th Cir. Oct. 14, 1992) (unpublished); Hamilton v. United States, 1993 WL
29207 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 1993) (unpublished); Johansen v. Airborne Freight Corp., 1993
WL 461162 (9th Cir. Nov. 10, 1993) (unpublished). The only possible, but unlikely
exception: Kessner v. First Bank, 1991 WL 216955 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 1991) (unpublished) (deferring breach issue until covenant's statute of limitations determined).
114. Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989) modified 60
F.3d 642 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994)).
115. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1994). The FTCA reads:
[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action
or claim against the United States ....
where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law
of the place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994). Although the FTCA bans punitive damages, the Montana
bad faith tort claim allowed the plaintiff to claim other types of tortious damages.
See Love, 915 F.2d at 1245.
116. Id. (holding that "breach of the duty of good faith is a tort properly brought
under the FTCA").
117.
961 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1992).
118.
Winchell, 961 F.2d at 1444 (distinguishing Love as lacking authority due to
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Similarly, in Hamilton v. United States,'19 a real estate developer claimed bad faith against government lenders when the
developer's mortgaged development scheme went awry. Profit
motive barred a Story special relationship, and the plaintiff lost
jurisdiction under FTCA. 2°
D. The Dearth of Tort in Post-Story ContractLaw
The examples of state and federal case law arising after
Story unequivocally support the conclusion that the commercial
bad faith tort is dead in Montana. The Montana Supreme Court
rejected every post-Story commercial bad faith tort claim. At the
federal level, courts summarily dismissed every bad faith tort
claim as well. The post-Story case history shows that any contract between commercial parties will fall within the for-profit
exclusion of the Story special relationship test and that Story
forecloses the possibility of tortious damages for commercial
parties. For contract plaintiffs in general, the special relationship
test, its second element, in particular, acts as a final stumbling
block to claiming tortious bad faith. Thus, by foreclosing the tort
claim, the Story test ends any economic incentive to use
Montana's bad faith action as opposed to a traditional contract
claim.
The bad faith contract action, however, is still viable, and
remains available for a plaintiff where the other party violates
the spirit of an agreement without breaching an express term.
The Story court explicitly stated that its special relationship
should not interfere with a party's bad faith claim for traditional
Hadley damages.1 Indeed, after Story, the Montana Supreme
Court upheld Hadley damages for bad faith in three commercial
cases and left open the same possibility on remand in four oth"' The impossibility of meeting the bad faith tort's special
ers. 22

Story's changes to Montana tortious bad faith law).
119.
1992 WL 29207 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 1993) (unpublished opinion).
120. Hamilton, 1993 WL 29207, *1.
121. Story, 242 Mont. at 450-51, 791 P.2d at 775-76; accord Haines Pipeline, 251
Mont. at 434, 830 P.2d at 1238; Beaverhead Bar Supply, 247 Mont. at 124, 805 P.2d
at 564; Trad Industries, 246 Mont. at 449, 805 P.2d at 61.
122. The court upheld the following cases: Fox Grain & Cattle Co. v. Maxwell,
267 Mont. 528, 885 P.2d 432 (1994); Haines Pipeline Constr., Inc. v. Montana Power
Co., 265 Mont. 282, 876 P.2d 632 (1994) (second appeal); Story 11, 259 Mont. 207,
856 P.2d 202 (1993) (second appeal).
The court remanded: Simmons Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., 258 Mont. 79, 86, 852
P. 523, 527 (1993) (applying California law, but stating that Montana law is identical); Daniels v. Dean, 253 Mont. 465, 833 P.2d 1078 (1992); Haines Pipeline, 251
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relationship test is simply irrelevant to making a bad faith contract claim, and the case law shows that the court continues to
affirm bad faith contract claims much as it did before Story. In
fact, the court's affirmation of bad faith claims for Hadley damages reinforces the conclusion that the court deliberately fashioned the special relationship test to reject bad faith tort claims.

V. THE BAD FAITH TORT: ECONOMIC & POLITICAL ISSUES
The period of judicial activism that Story ends marks a compelling period in Montana's legal history. From the practitioner's
perspective, the Story decision is significant for setting out an
important precedent for a commercial bad faith claim. The case
also deserves attention because it draws to a close the judiciary's
expansion of tort into contract damages. This section examines
the rise and fall of the bad faith tort in Montana as phenomena
which occurred within the state's economic and political landscape.
The reasons proffered by the Story court for correcting the
bad faith tort midstream warrant a reexamination. The court
gave four reasons for restricting the tort's use: (1) to restore the
opportunity for efficient breach, (2) to prevent the overuse of the
bad faith tort claim by plaintiffs, (3) to keep tort evidence out of
contract suits, and (4) to recognize the legislature's discontent
with the bad faith tort.1 2' The first factor, availability of efficient breach, is clearly an economic consideration for contracting
parties because it determines their ability to end less profitable
contractual arrangements. The second factor, plaintiff overuse of
the bad faith claim, economically influences contracting parties
in two ways. First, it increases the size of damages for breach.
Second, the threat of indeterminate tort damages makes it impossible to determine the cost of the previous factor, efficient
breach. The third factor, introduction of tort evidence into a
contract action, is principally a procedural issue; however, bad
faith's transformation from contract to tort invokes new issues
such as intent and wrongdoing which tend to overshadow traditional contract issues such as offer and acceptance. The bad faith
claim's procedural domination by tort issues exacerbates tort
damages' economic submersion of contract claims. Finally, the
fourth factor, public discontent expressed through the legisla-

Mont. 422, 830 P.2d 1230 (1992); Beaverhead Bar Supply, 247 Mont. 117, 805 P.2d
560 (1991).
123. Story, 242 Mont. at 448-49, 791 P.2d at 774-75.
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ture, arose primarily among contracting parties upset with the
impact of the bad faith tort on their business affairs. This political reaction to the tort can be seen as a manifestation of dissatisfaction with the tort's economic impact. Reasoning that these
largely economic concerns merited the creation of a special relationship test to limit the applicability of the bad faith tort, the
Story court explicitly recognized the economic and political repercussions of the bad faith tort's judicially-created existence. This
section reexamines those issues, but does so within an analytical
framework based upon economic and political theory.
The first part of this section examines the economic factors
involved in contract law. The focus is on a comparison of the
economic implications of Hadley damages with the bad faith tort.
The second part introduces a variation of Professor George J.
Stigler's theory of regulation.'2 4 It examines legislative action
taken to curtail the rise in tort awards as a reaction in the political economy to the judiciary's strong and, in some instances,
negative impact on the cost of doing business. Each section concludes with an application of the principles introduced to the bad
faith tort's history in Montana, attempting to gather new insights into the proper role of the bad faith claim in contract law.
A. Contract Law and the Economic Cost of Breach
Few scholars would argue that the law in areas such as
antitrust, intellectual property, and contract does not principally
affect market behavior. Economic issues play, in general, a larger role in contract law than, for example, criminal law; the types
of unacceptable behavior which contract law addresses are usually related to business transactions and the chief means of distributing justice in contract law is pecuniary damages, not jail
time."= Because contract law largely governs business activities and uses pecuniary damages to accomplish justice, it is
prime material for economic analysis. 26

124. Prof. Stigler's seminal research on regulation theory appeared in George J.
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. & MAN. Sci. 3
(1971). This Note actually relies, however, on a later work expanding upon Prof.
Stigler's work, Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.
ECON. & L. 211, 211 (1976).
125.
POSNER, supra note 4, § 19.7, at 535 (writing that "the implicit economic
content . . . may seem straightforward with regard to those areas-contracts
mainly . . . where transaction costs are low").
126. Judge Posner describes the purpose of contract law: "[tihus the fundamental
function of contract law (and recognized as such at least since Hobbes's day) is to
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Given the economic nature of contract law, it seems appropriate to treat judicial rulings in this area as a type of market
regulation. As such, economic principles applicable to market
regulation should apply to an analysis of the bad faith tort, a
regulation governing breach of contract.'2 7 The primary economic concept applied in the examination of the bad faith tort is
the cost of compliance." This concept highlights an important
aspect of judicial rulings. Contract law places a pecuniary burden not only on parties who violate its rules, but also on parties
who must change their behavior to comply with new law." For
the purposes of this discussion, both aspects of a ruling's impact,
the cost of breaking it and the cost of obeying it, are treated together as compliance costs. Furthermore, for the purposes of
comparing and contrasting traditional contract damages with the
bad faith tort, the inability of Hadley damages to provide a remedy for certain types of opportunistic breach which the bad faith
tort successfully deters is treated as another type of relative
compliance cost inherent in the Hadley damages doctrine. This
last compliance cost manifests itself as either a risk of opportunistic breach to which some parties will be subject or as a change
in such parties' behavior designed to avoid such risk. 30 Accordingly, the three types of compliance costs--cost of breach, cost of
obeying, and cost of omission-constitute the criteria for evaluating the Hadley rule and the bad faith tort's impact on contract
parties.
Judges regularly consider such compliance costs in the
course of making a ruling, but a structured approach to these

deter people from behaving opportunistically toward their contracting parties, in order to encourage the optimal timing of economic activity and (the same point) obviate costly self-protective measures." Id. § 4.1, at 91 (footnotes omitted).
But see id. § 13.1, at 367. The analogy overlooks the difference in litigation
127.
incentives for private civil actions and regulatory intervention by state agencies.
128. This Note uses the term, compliance cost, to refer to the transaction costs
associated with contracting under a particular contract regime. It derives its definition from the author's reading of RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
(4th ed. 1992); and it also adopts Judge Posner's position that an efficient contract
law will create incentives for value-maximizing conduct in the future. Id. § 4.1, at
95-96.
129. See id. (stating that parties will contract around unfavorable regulations,
but that such circumventions drive up the parties' contracting cost).
130. The conduct on the part of private parties who opportunistically breach
might appear to be outside the scope of the Hadley rule's compliance cost. The
Hadley rule, however, fails to deter conduct against which the bad faith tort provides
protection. Therefore, the Hadley regime enables parties to be hurt or forces them to
take steps to avoid being harmed, and these compliance costs related to Hadley's
lack of deterrence can properly be grouped together as costs of omission.
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concepts falls outside of traditional jurisprudence." 1 Moreover,
certain types of compliance costs, most notably the cost of obeying, are invisible to the judiciary because judges only see the
parties between whom problems arise; it is easy for judges to
underestimate the impact of rulings on those parties who obey
the new law. Yet, the political opposition to the bad faith tort
after Nicholson illustrates that the cost of obeying the law
should not be ignored by judges because it was precisely this
factor that led businesses to lobby the legislature for statutory
bans on the bad faith tort."2 To minimize the possibility of political backlash to judicial rulings, this section provides guidelines for evaluating all aspects of a ruling's compliance costs. By
utilizing this economic analysis, the judiciary can hopefully avoid
statutory interference with its contract law such as occurred
during the 1987 legislative session.'
The idea of minimizing compliance costs fits in with the
traditional jurisprudential goal of narrowly tailoring each ruling
to accomplish its aims with the least amount of interference to
the public."&Thus, the economic principles discussed here do
not supplant, but supplement traditional notions of justice." 5
When the court's economic analysis leads it to believe that a
ruling imposes too high a cost on some parties, the court might
reject that solution and use the same economic principles to
devise a different answer to the immediate dispute which would
impose less burden on those falling within the ruling's scope.3
In other words, the court can utilize economic principles within
its traditional jurisprudence to help discern hidden costs and to
refine its rulings to avoid imposing unnecessary burdens on par-

131. But see POSNER, supra note 4, § 2.2, at 23 (arguing that judge's rhetoric
obscures a commitment to economic efficiency on the part of the courts).
132.
This point is substantiated by insurance lobbyists who came before the
Montana Senate's Business and Industry Committee to testify in support of the Unfair Trade Practices Act for insurance. The insurance representatives stated that
insurance companies feel compelled by the threat of bad faith tort damages to settle
low limit claims "for more than what they are really worth," and that, therefore, the
insurance industry strongly supported a ban on bad faith tort damages in insurance
contracts. See Minutes of the Meeting: Consideration of H.B. 240 Before the Senate
Business and Industry Committee, 50th Mont. Leg. at 1, (March 9, 1987) [hereinafter
UTPAI Hearings] (statement of Randy Gray, State Farm Insurance and the National
Association of Independent Insurers).
133. See infra Section B of Part V.
134. See POSNER, supra note 4, § 2.2, at 24.
135. See Id.
136. See id. § 2.3, at 25 (stating that economic analysis can clarify value confficts and point the way towards the most efficient means of accomplishing a given
social goal).
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ties.137
The next section begins an examination of the benefits and
of the compliance costs inherent in Hadley damages and in the
bad faith tort. After illustrating the costs and benefits of each
damage regime, the discussion moves to Montana's leading commercial bad faith cases, Nicholson and Story. This section quantifies the costs that each decision imposed on Montana's contracting parties and concludes that the bad faith tort needs to remain
a very narrowly-tailored exception to the Hadley cap on contract
damages.
1. Hadley Damages and Efficient Breach
The following begins, on a theoretical level, a discussion of
the advantages and disadvantages inherent in a contract regime
based upon Hadley's cap on damages." The traditional examination of Hadley centers on the ability of parties to breach and
pay damages. 3 9 In modern times, proponents have used the
economic concept of efficiency to support the conclusion that
Hadley provides a benefit in allowing breach of unprofitable
agreements."4 If contract damages are limited to the value of
the contract, a party who is later offered a better deal can predict whether the new deal is worth breaching the pre-existing
agreement or not. If it is, the party may choose to breach, pay
damages to the former partner, and enter into the new, more
profitable deal."" The efficient breach calculation relies, however, on the breaching party's ability to pre-determine the cost of
137. Id.
138. For the purposes of this section, the foreseeable damages allowed under
Hadley will be treated as intrinsic to the value of the contract, and the phrase, "value of the contract," will be used as shorthand for the actual value of the bargain as
well as any other foreseeable damages covered under Hadley.
139. See Holmes, supra note 8, at 462.
140. See POSNER, supra note 4, § 4.8, at 119. The following gives a theoretical
example of how a party might choose to breach. A contracts with B to sell B 100
widgets costing 9 cents apiece for $1000. A contemplates $100 in profits from the
sale. B later receives an offer from C to sell B 1000 widgets for $800 dollars. C's
factory can produce the same widget at 7 cents per unit. If B is allowed to breach
his contract with A, and pay Hadley expectancy damages of $100 to A (the amount
of A's profit), B can buy the widgets from C for $800 dollars and save $100. A is no
worse off because A receives the $100 profit that he expected to receive, and C is
much happier because C can do business. Consequently, the efficient breach allows
everyone to be as well off or better off than if A and B executed the original contract--a win-win proposition called pareto superior by law and economic theorists. See
James M. Buchanan, Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and PoliticalEconomy, 2
J. L. & EcON. 124, 124-25 (1959) (defining pareto optimality).
141. Seaman's, 686 P.2d at 1173 (Bird, J., concurring and dissenting).
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breach as the value of the contract. Proponents of efficient
breach argue that the cumulative effect of encouraging efficient
breach will be to galvanize efficient economic arrangements and
help boost the economy's efficiency. 14 2 On the individual level,

by capping contract damages, Hadley allows a party to pay the
cost of breach and move on to better deals.
Efficient breach is both well-supported by legal scholars and
roundly criticized as well. Numerous authors have documented
problems inherent in the Hadley breach doctrine." The primary criticism is that Hadley damages undercompensate the nonbreaching party.'" To obtain compensation for breach, the nonbreaching party must seek redress in court." A successful
litigant's attorney's fees and court costs often significantly subtract from the value of any judgment, rendering a result far less
valuable than what execution of the contract would offer. As acknowledged by the Story court, parties may provide for court
costs and attorney's fees in the contract, but Hadley does not
provide for such expenses by default." Thus, litigation expenses represent one form of compliance costs of the Hadley rule-a
cost which is borne by the non-breaching party in contract disputes.
The second criticism of Hadley damages is that they do not
deter opportunistic parties from trying to avoid the responsibility
of compensating the other party for breach."'7 UPI's attempt to
avoid its lease obligations in Nicholson represents one example
of opportunistic breach. Judge Richard Posner describes such
behavior as where "the promisor wants the benefit of the bargain
without bearing the agreed upon cost, and exploits the inadequa142. See Freeman & Mills, 900 P.2d at 676-77 (traditional contract damages encourage efficient breach and a more efficient economy). Efficient breach theory relies
on a number of assumptions which may or may not accurate. For example, do parties pre-calculate the cost of breaching? Does the addition of tort damages actually
add significantly to the cost of breach when expert testimony on future earnings and
lost reputation already significantly increases damages for a breached contract beyond
the value of the actual bargain. Compare Story, 242 Mont. 436, 791 P.2d 767 with
Story 11, 259 Mont. 207, 856 P.2d 202 (Story I jury awards more than Story jury
despite absence of tort claim.).
143. See, e.g., Barry Perlstein, Crossing the Contract-TortBoundary: An Economic
Argument for the Imposition of Extracompensatory Damages for Opportunistic Breach
of Contract, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 877 (1992).
144.
See Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of
Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 629, 637 (1988).
145. Id.
146. Story, 242 Mont. at 448, 791 P.2d at 774.
147.
See Perlstein, supra note 143, at 880 (arguing that not deterring opportunism through punitive damages is economically inefficient).
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cies of purely compensatory remedies [to avoid fulfilling the
financial responsibility for breach].""~ Another example of such
behavior is the insurance company which refuses to settle claims
on behalf of its policyholder.1 49 As pointed out earlier the inadequacy of Hadley damages in deterring such behavior, was the
driving force behind development of the bad faith tort.15 ° The
inability of Hadley to deter opportunistic breach can be construed as a second compliance cost imposed on parties who suffer
uncompensated loss or who must change their behavior to avoid
such loss.
2. The Bad Faith Tort and Protection of Weaker Parties
The second contract damages theory, the bad faith tort,
arose as a solution to the failure of Hadley damages to deter
opportunistic breach by insurance companies.' At first, courts
created a single exception to the Hadley ban on tort damages by
allowing punitive and other types of tort damages for policyholder claims against insurance companies that refused to settle
third party claims.'5 2 The courts recognized the inability of policyholders to negotiate the terms of their policies and, at the
same time, the overwhelming reliance of the policyholder on the
insurance company to protect it from the harm specified in the
policy." Thus, from the start, the bad faith tort existed as an
exception to Hadley damages delimited by the existence of a
quasi-fiduciary relationship. However, the quasi-fiduciary limitation was not originally articulated as a special relationship test,
but as a bright line rule restricting the tort's use to the thirdparty insurance claim context.' 54 Courts expanded the tort's use
to analogous situations where the contracting parties shared
California and
some type of quasi-fiduciary relationship."
Montana selectively recognized the bad faith tort claim in various contractual contexts such as first-party insurance claims,

148. Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 1988).
149. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (1967).
150. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
151. See Macintosh, supra note 15, at 487-97 (describing history and rationale
behind the bad faith tort); Chutorian, supra note 13, at 391-92 (describing bad faith
tort as solution to inherent limitations for traditional contract remedies).
152. See Macintosh, supra note 15, at 487-88.
153. See id. at 502 (arguing that policy reasons for the quasi-fiduciary bad faith
tort are two: reliance theory and unequal relationship theory).
154. Seaman's, 686 P.2d at 1166.
155. See Chutorian, supra note 13, at 396-402.
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banking, and employee dismissal suits. 156 The courts applied
the tort to these types of contracts as a means of penalizing
powerful parties who oppress their weaker counterparts. 157 The
extra compensation and protection afforded weak contracting
parties by the tort is clearly its largest benefit."5
An additional benefit of the tort is that it indirectly, but
adequately, compensates successful claimants for the adjudication costs of litigating the claim. The tort award potentially
brings the court-ordered compensation above the value of the
contract, and thereby indirectly can cover the litigation expenses
of recovering the loss.'59 Thus, the tort acts as a buffer to absorb the cost of litigating the claim and allows the plaintiff to
recover an amount equal or more than the value of the contract.
In short, by deterring opportunistic breach and by offsetting
adjudication costs, the bad faith tort solves the inadequacies of
Hadley damages.
Not surprisingly, the tort's tradeoff in solving Hadley's shortcomings is a loss of Hadley's major benefit: efficient breach.
When the tort remained an exception to Hadley damages, its
disruption of efficient breach applied to only the stronger parties
in a quasi-fiduciary relationship-originally only insurance companies. Thus, the primary compliance cost of the bad faith tort,
loss of efficient breach, applied to only those narrowly targeted
stronger quasi-fiduciaries. However, as Montana and California
courts recognized the tort in various contexts, the consequences
were double-edged. More parties were protected against oppression, but more parties lost the opportunity to breach efficiently."6 In other words, as the bad faith tort outgrew its status as
an exception to Hadley damages, the compliance cost spread to
more and more contracting parties.'
The inevitable question arising from the bad faith tort's
growth from an insurance tort into a general contract tort is
whether the bad faith tort is an adequate replacement for

156. See supra notes 27-29, 32 and accompanying text.
157. See Macintosh, supra note 15, at 504.
158. See Chutorian, supra note 13, at 391.
159. While the adjudication costs must still be subtracted from the judgment, the
remaining amount will still be more than the value of tlhz- con-tract. Thus, thc tcr's
possibility of a return greater than the value of the contract acts as a legitimate
reason, if not an incentive, to invest in the cost of litigation. See POSNER, supra note
4, § 21.16, at 588 (arguing that investment in litigation services is guided by private
benefits).
160. See Story, 242 Mont. at 448, 791 P.2d at 774.
161. Accord Freeman & Mills, 900 P.2d at 676.
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Hadley damages, or should remain an exception within contract
law."12 The biggest factor in evaluating the expansion of the
bad faith tort will be a reassessment of its compliance costs as it
interferes with efficient breach for increasing numbers of parties." Magnifying the significance of the tort's growth is its
inability to coexist with Hadley damages.'6" Efficient breach
breaks down in situations where contract damages are indeterminate; therefore, where the bad faith tort and Hadley damages
apply to the same contract, the latter's efficient breach becomes
impractible, and its cap on damages meaningless."6 In other
words, where they overlap, the bad faith tort subsumes Hadley
damages. Consequently, the bad faith tort must either replace
the Hadley scheme of damages or remain at most a narrowly
tailored exception to it.
3. Nicholson: The Cost of the Tort
This Note opened with a discussion of the bad faith tort's
spread in Montana and other states, and described how Montana
elevated the tort to its zenith by sanctioning its use in commercial contracts.' The case responsible for the tort's spread,
Nicholson, stands out because the Nicholson court, by failing to
limit the scope of its tort, created the precedent for a line of
tortious commercial breach cases unparalleled in Montana, if not
the nation.'67 An examination of Nicholson and its aftermath
indicates that the court's attempt to confine the tort's use to
egregious situations was unsuccessful for two reasons. First, the
seeds of this unlimited expansion of the tort are found in the
Nicholson court's abandonment of the quasi-fiduciary restriction
162. See Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation, and Liability
Rules-A Comment, 11 J. L. & ECON., 67, 68 (1968) (arguing transaction costs can
impede parties from negotiating around misallocations). But see Craswell, supra note
144, at 635 (arguing that regardless of damages doctrine, goods will likely end up in
the hands of highest bidder); Ian R. MacNeil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in
the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947 (1982) (attacking presumptions of efficient breach doctrine).
163. See POSNER, supra note 4, § 4.1, at 93 (stating that court needs to provide
economically efficient means of dealing with contract disputes).
164. See Freeman & Mills, 900 P.2d at 677.
165. See id. at 682. Suppose that in the example in supra note 140, A sued B
for breach and received not only $100 in expectancy damages, but $500 for tort bad
faith. Not only is B worse off than if he performed, but how could B predict a jury's
award? See Craswell, supra note 144, at 632 (arguing that courts should give weight
to predictability of legal rules).
166. See supra Part II.
167. See Macintosh, supra note 15, at 497.
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to the tort's use.' Perhaps the facts of the case forced this concession. Nicholson and UPI were both sophisticated parties experienced in arms-length commercial dealings. 169 No relationship
exists more antagonistic to the concept of quasi-fiduciaries than
an arms-length contractual arrangement between sophisticated
commercial parties.
Second, after abandoning the quasi-fiduciary restriction, the
Nicholson court tried, but failed to avoid the tort's disruption of
efficient breach by declaring that bad faith breach could be distinguished from efficient breach through an inspection of the
party's "justifiable expectations." 170 However, the court's justi-

fied expectations test proved illusory because the tort's larger
awards created an economic incentive for plaintiffs to describe
every breach as an egregious violation of his or her justified
expectations.' The test offered no substantive criteria to determine when a breach rose to the level of bad faith. Thus, despite the court's assertion to the contrary, the Nicholson test
provided no real means of differentiating bad faith from efficient
breach in the face of a plaintiff's economic incentive to claim
breach in bad faith. The subsequent rise in commercial bad faith
contract claims illustrates that Nicholson provided no basis for
restricting the bad faith tort's use 72 and that the subsequent
overuse of the tort by plaintiffs imposed a high
compliance cost
73
on commercial contract parties in Montana.
It could be argued that the defendant has the opportunity to
present evidence proving that a breach was not made in bad
faith. The procedural transformation of the bad faith claim from
contract to tort, however, still disadvantages the defendant as
the issues move from offer and acceptance to intent and wrongdoing.' The procedural transformation also underscores the
disruptive effect of tort damages on contract law as the Hadley
168. See Nicholson, 219 Mont. at 39-42, 710 P.2d at 1347-48.
169. Id. at 34, 710 P.2d at 1343.
170. Id. at 41-42, 710 P.2d at 1348.
171. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. The post-Nicholson case law
demonstrates a rise in use of the bad faith tort. This rise can be seen as evidence of
the economic incentive to make bad faith claims. See Story, 242 Mont. at 448-49, 791
P.2d at 774-75; POSNER, supra note 4, § 22.1, at 596 (arguing that private fines
provide incentive for private enforcers (i.e., plaintiffs lawyers) to seek out violations).
172.
To analyze the difference between the post-Nicholson and post-Story case
law, compare supra notes 46-47 with supra notes 91-92.
173.
See Story, 242 Mont. at 448-49, 791 P.2d at 774-75 (discussing bad faith
tort's interference with efficient breach and court's attempts to prevent the action's
overuse).
174. Id. at 448, 791 P.2d at 774.
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claims are mixed with bad faith claims.'7 5 By extinguishing the
quasi-fiduciary limitation to the bad faith tort's use, Nicholson
extended the availability of the bad faith claim to any suit for
contract breach. The court's revision of the law, in effect, denied
the efficient breach option to every commercial contracting party
in Montana-a high price to pay for the protection which the
tort's expansion afforded.
Three significant points can be drawn from Nicholson's impact on Montana's contract parties. First, the decision shows
that where the bad faith tort and traditional contract claim overlap, plaintiff incentive to increase the size of the award will drive
the tort's usurpation of traditional contract law. Second, a subjective test of egregiousness, such as Nicholson's "justified expectations," will fail to deter plaintiffs from using the tort wherever
possible. Third, the consequence of potential tort liability in any
contract action is the complete loss of efficient breach in contracting, a large compliance cost for the parties affected.'76
The Nicholson tort may have an additional drawback which
deserves illumination. The original quasi-fiduciary tort's restriction served two purposes: (1) to deter oppression of weaker parties by stronger counterparts, and (2) to restrict the tort's use to
preserve efficient breach in non-quasi-fiduciary contexts.'
Nicholson, by exceeding the tort's original scope, not only unnecessarily interfered with efficient breach, but may also have imposed another compliance cost: loss of the bad faith tort's special
protection for weaker parties. As argued below, this loss derives
from the economic cost which the Nicholson tort placed on
Montana's contract parties.
Needless to say, the Nicholson tort maintained the bad faith
claim's protection against opportunistic breach; however, the
Nicholson tort indirectly added a new cost of doing business in
Montana which may have disproportionately fallen on the shoulders of weaker contract parties. By discouraging efficient breach,
Nicholson, at least theoretically, inhibited the efficiency of
Montana's businesses.'7 8 The following explains how sophisti-

175. See Freeman & Mills, 900 P.2d at 676.
176. The third point illustrates the intimate connection between the compliance
cost of parties who violate and who obey contract law. See Story, 242 Mont. at 448,
791 P.2d at 774.
177. See Macintosh, supra note 15, at 503, 511.
178. Post-Nicholson, a jury could award large tort damages for a bad faith claim;
therefore, a party contemplating breach of an existing contract in order to pursue a
better offer could not accurately estimate the cost of the contemplated breach. In the
face of such expensive uncertainty, the party was probably safer sticking with the
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cated businesses may have been better able to recognize and
avoid the costs of the bad faith tort and that the economic burden placed on contracting parties by Nicholson fell heaviest on
weaker parties who lacked the sophistication to avoid it.
One would suppose that a bank or insurance company would
realize that suits for contract breach and for bad faith would
arise within the scope of their normal business activities.179
Consequently, such a sophisticated party would calculate the
actuarial risk of tortious contract suits' and take steps to
minimize exposure to the added cost of tort liability. A sophisticated business might react to the added risk by moving out of
Montana to other markets or by passing the cost of insuring
against it to customers and business partners in a weaker bargaining position. It seems reasonable, on the other hand, to believe that small commercial entities and consumers would fail to
either perceive or pass off the added cost of potential contractual
tort liability. Furthermore, nothing would prevent the banks,
insurance companies, and other sophisticated parties from shifting their added tort liability costs to contracting partners who
might very well have been one of the few recipients of the quasifiduciary tort's restricted protection. In effect, Nicholson's increase in the cost of doing business would fall heaviest on parties
lacking the sophistication to recognize and respond to the new
cost. It is plausible to posit that many of these businesses bearing the added cost could be the type of business which the bad
faith tort was supposed to protect. Such costs would undercut
Justice Trieweiler's assertion in his Haines dissent that a bad
faith tort protects small businesspersons.' The tort would, in
less lucrative deal. According to the theory of efficient breach, the overall impact of
Nicholson should have been to discourage contracting parties in Montana from
breaching inefficient contracts and to remain in less profitable arrangements. The net
effect of such conduct would be a drag on Montana's economy. See Freeman & Mills,
900 P.2d at 6276-77, 782 (both majority and dissent stating that efficient breach encourages an efficient economy).
179.
For a discussion of the role of risk taking in business decisionmaking, see
RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL, ECONOMICS 167-68 (8th ed. 1987).
180.
The risk of bad faith tort liability could be estimated by calculating probability distributions for bad faith tort losses combining risk frequency and risk severity predictions. See EUGENE F. BRIGHAM & LouIs C. GAPENSKI, INTERMEDIATE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 960-62 (Ath ed. 1993).
Justice Trieweiler reasoned that consumers and small business people will
181.
suffer under the Story special relationship test because the court's denial of bad faith
tort claims will facilitate oppressive acts on the part of larger corporations. Haines
Pipeline, 251 Mont. at 437, 830 P.2d at 1240 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting). Justice
Trieweiler's comment fails to take into account the negative impact of a rise in contracting costs for the protected group, i.e. their compliance costs. A failure to consid-
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fact, disproportionately burden smaller parties and would interfere with the ability of all businesspersons to breach unprofitable
economic arrangements.
To summarize the above discussion of Nicholson, Nicholson
did not add a new quasi-fiduciary relationship subject to the bad
faith tort, but it eliminated any quasi-fiduciary boundaries to the
tort and made it applicable to all contracts. The court did not realize that its justified expectations test would fail to limit the
tort's use. The overuse of the bad faith tort after Nicholson
foreclosed the option of efficient breach for Montana's contracting
parties. The resulting economic inefficiency and possibly disproportional costs associated with a risk of contractual tort liability
only compounded the compliance cost of the Nicholson bad faith
tort. If one believes that Nicholson's abandonment of the tort's
quasi-fiduciary restriction exceeded the tort's intended role in
contract law, the compliance costs for Montana parties contracting after Nicholson merely manifest the holding's overbreadth.
The tort's overbreadth can also be equated with the replacement of contract damages by a tort regime for contract breach.
Thus, Nicholson's compliance costs can be seen as the costs inherent in a comprehensive contractual tort regime-and indicative of the unsuitability of tort law as a replacement for Hadley
damages. In conclusion, the failure of Nicholson demonstrates
that the bad faith tort should remain no more than a limited
exception to the Hadley cap on contract damages tailored to fit
specific situations where public policy requires special protection
for weaker parties.
4. Story's Common Ground
In light of Nicholson's overbreadth and high compliance
costs, the Story court attempted to strike a balance between
protection of quasi-fiduciaries and the availability of efficient
breach.'82 The court restricted most contract actions to Hadley
damages by foreclosing tort liability with a gauntlet of special
relationship conditions. For parties not able to meet its special
relationship test, Story reestablishes not only efficient breach,
but all of its aforementioned inadequacies. 1" On the other

er indirect external costs of a regulatory policy often leads to false conclusions. RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., supra note 179, 22-23.

182. See supra Section D of Part III.
183. The inadequacies are opportunistic breach and undercompensation of litigation costs.
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hand, a plaintiff who meets the Story relationship test can still
obtain tort damages. Thus, quasi-fiduciary relationships retain
the enhanced deterrence of the bad faith tort. Of course, the
stronger parties in such relationships must bear the loss of efficient breach as a compliance cost, but the scope of parties losing
the efficient breach option under Story is far smaller than under
Nicholson.
The Story decision does not represent a synthesis of the
quasi-fiduciary and efficient breach models. Instead, it bifurcates
bad faith along lines designed to sever quasi-fiduciary contracts
from commercial contracts. It explicitly recognizes the quasifiduciary relationship as not only the public policy rationale for
allowing tort damages, but uses it as a bright line test to limit
the tort's use. Thus, a contract meeting the special relationship
test receives the extra protection and extra burdens of tort damages, while the contract with no special relationship receives the
advantages and disadvantages of the efficient breach model.
Story does not solve the problems inherent in either model, but it
categorizes contracts in a way which will bring most contract
disputes under the regime with remedies best fashioned for resolving disputes of that nature and with compliance costs most
appropriate to the economic interests implicated by that class of
contracts. For commercial parties, this means that the non-profit
element of the Story special relationship test will preclude the
bad faith tort and bring the dispute within the framework of
traditional Hadley contract law. Although some parties will be
subject to opportunistic breach because of Story, for commercial
parties, the ability to breach efficiently can be considered a
greater benefit overall. Post-Story case law shows that, unlike
Nicholson's justified expectations, the Story test acts as a clear
standard for discriminating between contracts which do and do
not fall within the scope of its bad faith tort. The same case law
reveals that Montana commercial contract parties can conduct
themselves secure in the knowledge that their contractual arrangements do not carry the potential cost of tort liability.1 '"
By returning the bad faith tort to its role as a narrow quasifiduciary exception to Hadley contract law, Story allows efficient
breach in most cases, but affords special protection to some parties. Although the Story special relationship test expressly allows
insureds and other weaker parties to bring bad faith tort claims
against powerful contract parties, the case law is, for the most

184.

See supra Sections B and C of Part IV.
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part, silent on this issue. Legislative actions taken after
Nicholson preempted the common law governing most contracts
possessing the indicia of a quasi-fiduciary relationship. The next
part of this section discusses the legislature's actions banning
the bad faith tort in certain contractual contexts and how economic interests orchestrated such change in the political arena.
B. The Reaction in the PoliticalEconomy to the Bad Faith Tort
Statutes passed in 1987 by the Montana State Legislature
create an important parallel to Nicholson and Story. Those acts,
the Unfair Trade Practices Act For Insurance or UTPAI 1 and
the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA), s6 like
Story, banned bad faith tort claims, but only in the areas of
insurance claims and employee contracts. UTPAI and WDEA,
however, were not in response to Nicholson, but to two separate
lines of cases" 7 which had previously recognized the quasi-fiduciary bad faith tort."s The legislature introduced UTPAI in response to the tort's initial appearance in Montana as an action
for insurance contract disputes in 1979.189 WDEA arose from
the political reaction to the tort's incremental expansion into the
employee discharge context beginning in 1983.19° The economic
impact of these cases' compliance costs were similar to as those
outlined for Nicholson. The major difference was that the tort
applied only to certain types of stronger parties to a quasi-fiduciary contract, i.e., insurance companies and employers. These
targeted groups responded to the court's imposition of a new
business cost by lobbying the legislature to address the common
law bad faith tort as it applied to them 9 ' and successfully de-

185.
Codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-18-101 to -1006 (1995).
186.
Codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -915 (1995).
187.
For insurance bad faith cases, see, e.g.: Britton v. Farmers Ins. Group, 221
Mont. 67, 721 P.2d 303 (1986); Fode v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 221 Mont. 282, 719 P.2d
414 (1986); Klaudt v. Flink, 202 Mont. 247, 658 P.2d 1065 (1983); First Sec. Bank v.
Goddard, 181 Mont. 407, 593 P.2d 1040 (1979).
See the following for bad faith employee discharge suits: Dare v. Montana
Petro. Mktg. Co., 212 Mont. 274, 687 P.2d 1015 (1984); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins.
Co., 205 Mont. 304, 668 P.2d 213 (1983).
188.
In contrast, Nicholson removed the quasi-fiduciary limitation on use of the
bad faith tort. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
189. First Sec. Bank, 181 Mont. at 419-20, 593 P.2d at 1047 (awarding punitive
bad faith damages against disability insurer who falsely denied validity of policy).
190.
Gates, 205 Mont. at 307, 668 P.2d at 215 (awarding punitive damages
against employer for acting in bad faith by not returning resignation letter signed
under threat of job termination).
191. For example, one insurance representative testified:
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manded protection of their economic interests against judiciallycreated tort damages.19 2 The next section explores how these
events, parallel, yet connected to the commercial contract cases,
Nicholson and Story, reflect the interplay of politics and economics in the legislative process.
1. Legislation Theory
This section relies largely on legislation theory derived from
Professor George J. Stigler's economic research on regulatory
bodies.193 The legislative version of regulation theory essentially predicts that legislators draft legislation that will enhance
their reelection prospects."9 The two types of support which a
legislator needs to win reelection are money and votes.'9 5 However, voters' interests are dispersed and voter support is not
guaranteed by any particular piece of legislation."96 Special interest groups, however, will respond favorably to particular pieces of legislation; these lobby groups can influence the legislative
process by pledging votes and campaign funds to legislators who
support the group's agenda.'9 7 The ultimate conclusion of legislation theory is that legislators will draft bills distorted in favor
of special interest groups able to assert influence within the
legislative halls by promising campaign support.'9 8 This Note
makes the assumption that industry groups testifying before
Montana legislative committees possess that type of political

[Tihere has been no single incident in the past five years that has
had a greater impact than the development of the tort of bad faith. This
has caused markets to seriously consider the continued interest in doing
business in the state of Montana and has adversely affected him and many
of his clients.
UTPAI Hearings, supra note 132, at 2 (statement of Thomas A. Grau, partner,
Century Agency).
192. A member of the Montana Liability Coalition stated: "The employer's decision to terminate an employee for a legitimate business reason should not subject
[sic] to subsequent ratification by a jury at any time."
Minutes of the Meeting: Consideration of H.B. 241 before the House Judiciary
Committee, 50th Mont. Leg. at 1 (Jan. 28, 1987) [hereinafter WDEA Hearings] (statement of Jim Robischon, Montana Liability Coalition).
193. See Peltzman, supra note 124, at 211.
194. POSNER, supra note 4, § 19.3, at 525.
195.
Peltzman, supra note 124, at 214. Of course, the ultimate objective of a politician is to win votes; but the implication of regulation theory is that drafting legislation which attracts campaign funds is more effective than drafting legislation which
directly garners voter support. See POSNER, supra note 4, § 19.3, at 525.
196.
Peltzman, supra note 124, at 213.
197.
See POSNER, supra note 4, § 19.3, at 525.
198. Id.
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clout.
Legislation theory makes another interesting prediction
about the political process. It identifies the characteristics of
groups that should be able to lobby successfully the legislature.'9 9 The fundamental premise is that a relatively small, homogenous group (i.e., a manufacturing industry with inter-industry links) will be more effective than a diffuse, heterogenous
group (such as individual consumers) to (1) recognize its economic interest in favorable legislation, and (2) unite to spend resources on a common agenda. 00 The next part of this section
evaluates the evisceration of the bad faith tort in the legislature
within the framework of legislation theory.
2. Legislative History of Statutory Bans on Bad Faith
An examination of the legislature's actions and the history of
UTPAI and WDEA reveal a pattern of lobbying and political
action in keeping with theoretical predictions of how legislators
and lobbyists interact. First, in regards to UTPAI, the insurer
lobby, representing a discrete industry with a monolithic interest
in reducing insurer's bad faith tort damages, seems to possess
the qualities conducive to an effective lobbying effort. As evidenced by its strong presence at the UTPAI hearings, the insurance lobby represents a fairly small and cohesive industry that
presented a concentrated lobbying effort to ban the bad faith
tort.20 ' On the other hand, UTPAI's legislative history lacks
any testimony by insureds on the need or desirability of a ban on
bad faith tort damages.0 2 One might accept testimony in opposition to such legislation by the Montana Trial Lawyers Association (M.T.L.A.), °3 a plaintiff lawyer lobby, as a surrogate for
199. Peltzman, supra note 124, at 212-13.
200. The first premise can be understood through the following example of how
fewness of members provides economic incentive to act:
[1]f a group of 10 takes $20 from 100 others, the cost per transferor is only
20 [cents] and benefit per transferee is $20; if the size of the groups is reversed, the cost is $2 per transferor and the benefit is only 20 [cents] per
transferee.
POSNER, supra note 4, § 19.3, at 525. The example makes clear why the
smaller group has greater incentive to seek a regulatory transfer of wealth to it than
the larger group and greater incentive to prevent a transfer from it. The same holds
for legislation protecting the smaller groups' interests by promoting oligopoly through
limiting market entry or regulating price competition. Id.
201. Out of four UTPAJ proponents who testified, three came from the insurance
industry. See UTPAI Hearings, supra note 132, at 1-2.
202. See generally id. at 1-4.
203. Two UTPAI opponents testified. One was Carl Englund, M.T.L.A. The other
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insured testimony; but, more likely, M.T.L.A. efforts serve as further evidence of the ability of small, relatively homogenous
groups to recognize and take action to protect their economic
interests. In M.T.L.A.'s case, its interests overlap with the
insured's,2 °4 but at least according to legislation theory, the
driving force behind the organization's appearance would be the
plaintiff litigator's pecuniary interest in increasing the size of
awards for contract breach.0' °
The legislative history for WDEA further supports the legislation theory analysis. Here, the variety and number of employers is much greater than those interests found supporting
UTPAI, which introduces the possibility of free-rider problems.0 ' Nonetheless, the legislative history reflects a well-coordinated lobbying effort to stop tort damages for at-will employee
termination.2 " ' The ability of employers to unite could reflect
that lobbying activities are feasible for even fairly large groups
where the common economic interest is readily apparent.0 s A
further advantage to the employer's lobby is the complete absence of an opposing employee lobby as evidenced by the lack of
testimony by at-will employees at WDEA hearings."M It would
seem that by definition, the at-will employees exist as unorganized individuals facing significant informational and organizational hurdles to coordinating a lobby against the tort reform.
Another explanation for the coordinated response of the employer lobby to employee discharge tort reform is that the insurance

was John Hoyt, an attorney from Great Falls. See id. at 3.
204. M.T.L.A.'s Mr. Englund describes insurance bad faith as "the right to a
private cause of action for lawsuit by someone who has been injured by the failure
of an insurance company . . . ." Id. at 3 (statement of Carl Englund, M.T.L.A.).
See POSNER, supra note 4, § 22.1, at 595-96 (describing how economic incen205.
tives can drive law enforcement).
206. No less than twelve different type of businesses and commercial associations, not counting the appearance of defense lawyers, testified in favor of WDEA.
See WDEA Hearings, supra note 192, at 1-3. Free riders are members within a class
of beneficiaries who obtain all the advantages of a given entitlement or other benefit
without contributing towards its creation or maintenance. For an example of free rider behavior in the retail context, see POSNER, supra note 4, § 10.3, at 295.
207. See WDEA Hearings, supra note 192, at 1-3.
208. Free riders greatly reduce the feasible size of groups attempting to form
cartels; but a number of factors ameliorate the free rider problem for lobbying. First,
lobbying is legal; therefore, an industry can take concerted and public action to
pressure free riders into contributing to their lobby. Second, the increase in free
rider problems inherent in larger groups is offset by a larger group's ability to pull
votes in support of its agenda, a method besides campaign fund contributions of
enhancing political clout. See POSNER, supra note 4, § 19.3, at 525.
209. See generally WDEA Hearings, supra note 192, at 1-4.
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industry lent its support and organizational capabilities to the
employer lobby.2 1 Tortious bad faith employee discharge damages implicate liability insurer's interests because these insurers
must often take financial responsibility for their policyholders'
bad faith torts.2 1' To sum up, in both the UTPAI and WEDA
legislative histories, clear evidence exists that industry recognized its economic interests in favorable tort reform and that
affected businesses coordinated a lobbying effort to push for
favorable legislation. Can the fact that the legislature passed
pro-industry legislation be seen as merely coincidental?
The absence of a legislative ban on commercial bad faith is
the final piece of evidence supporting the legislation theory analysis. That such a void would exist can be inferred from the lack
of any cohesive characteristics shared by the successful industrial lobbyists in the group affected by the Nicholson version of the
bad faith tort. The group, of course, is commercial contracting
parties: a disorganized, disparate group stretching across various
industries, with probably few common business interests or existing channels of communication.1 2 Legislation theory predicts
that such a disparate group cannot effectively organize to lobby. ' The legislature did not pass a ban for commercial bad
faith which, by omission, supports the prediction that commercial parties could not organize an effort to ban the commercial
bad faith tort. This evidence is by negative implication, however,
and subsequent analysis might reveal better explanations.

210. "Prior to 1987, the case-law development . . . [of the employee discharge
bad faith tort] generated a belief among Montana employers and insurance companies . . . that their best hope for changing the direction of the law was through
direct legislative action."
LeRoy H. Schramm, Montana Employment Law and the 1987 Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act: A New Order Begins, 51 MONT. L. REV. 94, 108 (1990).
211. "[U]npredictability [in employer bad faith law], coupled with what employers
perceived as unreasonably large awards to wrongful discharge claimants, led Montana
employers and insurance companies (who paid the employment discharge awards) to
seek legislative reform."
M. Scott Regan, Tonack v. Montana Bank: Preemption, Interpretation,and Older Employees Under Montana's Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, 56 MONT.
L. REv. 585, 588 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
212.
See supra notes 46-47, 91-92 for contract suits between a wide variety of
businesses. It is also worth noting that unlike insurance companies and employers,
commercial enterprises were not always the target of the Nicholson bad faith tort.
Plaintiffs such as Nicholson were commercial parties as well, and were beneficiaries
of the tort's expanded damages. Because commercial parties might perceive
themselves as potential plaintiffs as well as potential defendants, the economic impact of the Nicholson tort would not be as clearly one-sided as for industries affected
by a quasi-fiduciary bad faith tort.
213. See POSNER, supra note 4, at § 19.3, at 525.
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For example, one area of the commercial bad faith tort,
banking bad faith, which was recognized before Nicholson,"4
but not banned until Story,215 extended the quasi-fiduciary relationship to banks. Presumably banks have the characteristics
of an industry able to lobby effectively. Banks have a well-defined economic interest in opposing a bad faith tort for lending
and credit institutions and should possess the cohesiveness to
organize a lobby against the banking bad faith tort. Yet, the
legislature never took action on the banking industry's behalf.
This omission represents the largest failure of legislation theory
to explain the political events surrounding the bad faith tort's
rise and fall.
3. The Political Process Behind Tort Reform
Regardless of the anomaly presented by the banking industry, legislation theory provides two valuable insights into the
legislative process. First, the types of industries whose contracts
possess the indicia of a quasi-fiduciary relationship also seem to
be the types of business possessing the cohesiveness to lobby
effectively. The overlap indicates that fairly cohesive industries
with well-defined economic interests might frequently possess
the ability (a) to breach opportunistically and (b) to pressure the
legislature for favorable market regulation. In other words, the
ascription of quasi-fiduciary characteristics to a particular industry is merely another way of saying that it possesses oligopolistic
tendencies.216 The overlap suggests that opportunistic breach is
a form of anti-competitive behavior and that its deterrence might
be justified on economic as well as normative grounds.2 "7

214. First Nat'l Bank v. Twombly, 213 Mont. 66, 73, 689 P.2d 1226, 1230 (1984)
(holding punitive bad faith damages available where bank improperly offset debtor's
checking funds against promissory note).
215.
See, e.g. Lachenmeir v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 246 Mont. 26, 33, 803 P.2d
614, 618 (1990) (dismissing debtor's bad faith claim against bank who foreclosed on
loan where debtor failed (1) to prove breach of Story's honesty-in-fact standard and
(2) to meet the Story special relationship test).
216.
Thus, if opportunistic breach is construed as one form of market failure, the
legislature's bad faith tort reform taken on behalf of industries in the position to
breach opportunistically is one more illustration of an elected body's anti-competitive
tendency to protect the interests of powerful industrial lobbies. See POSNER, supra
note 4, § 19.3, at 525.
217.
See Chutorian, supra note 13, at 394 (arguing that bad faith tort damages
represent an economically sound remedy in the insurance context). Nonetheless, the
Nicholson ruling exemplifies the economic incentive for plaintiffs to abuse a ruling
that allows tortious contract damages. In other words, while opportunistic breach
might be anti-competitive, the inefficiencies of any regulatory solution may be great-
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Second, the legislature's statutory solution to the bad faith
tort's existence seems at odds with any rational judicial or economic basis for its actions. Within the context of the competing
needs of the insurer/insured and the employer/employee, a strong
argument could be made that the legislature's bad faith bans
favor the needs of the industrial lobby at the expense of employees and insureds. Such a result is impossible to justify on the
basis of traditional jurisprudence, with its normative values of
fairness to all and careful scrutiny of measures adversely affecting weaker parties. From an economic perspective as well, the
legislature's deeds are inexplicable. Putting aside the question of
whether the bad faith tort is a necessary deterrent for employers
and insurers, the earlier discussion of commercial cases illustrated that the bad faith tort is most inappropriate for arms-length
contracts negotiated between commercial parties." 8 For the legislature to allow the bad faith tort's existence to continue in the
commercial realm and not in contracts where the quasi-fiduciary
nature of the relationship provides a normative, if not economic,
basis for the tort is irrational." 9 In short, whether viewed from
a jurisprudential or an economic perspective, the legislature's
actions banning bad faith exemplify its lobby-driven agenda; and,
thus, its inability to fashion equitable and efficient statutes.
If the legislature is institutionally flawed in its ability to
deliver fundamentally fair market regulation, the focus on a
branch of government capable of fulfilling this role shifts back to
the judiciary. Yet, the legislative histories of UTPAI and WEDA,
and the Story opinion all include evidence that the compliance
costs of the court's bad faith tort-whether intended or
not-brought about significant political opposition, and subsequent legislative action to curb those costs. Thus, the court's
actions can be considered the initiating event for the entire political and economic upheaval. On the other hand, the Story
court returned the bad faith tort to its proper role as a quasifiduciary exception to limited Hadley damages. Thus, if one considers Story to represent the best compromise of contract and
tort for bad faith claims, the judiciary deserves credit for
adopting that solution from California common law. The Story
decision exemplifies the court's ability to balance its normative
er.
218. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
219. The assumption is that the normative goal of preventing opportunistic
breach legitimates the judiciary's use of market-distorting economic disincentives to
breach. See POSNER, supra note 4, § 19.1, at 519.
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goals and to structure its rulings to efficiently accomplish them,
suggesting that the judicial branch is capable of shaping contract
law to fairly and flexibly govern the economic activities of contract parties.
The unfortunate aspect of the bad faith tort's fall is that the
legislative bans block the full effect of the Story special relationship and prevent the court from reshaping common law in those
areas as new situations develop. Yet, the positive role of the
legislature cannot be overlooked. The Story court pointed to
those bans as legislative disapproval of the common law bad
faith tort and took that disapproval as a sign that the common
law needed midstream corrections. Thus, the legislature's disapproval-a political manifestation of the court's adverse impact on
powerful businesses-and the legislature's ability to articulate
that disapproval-with statutes preempting court authority-may serve as important factors in discouraging courts from
economically irrational rulings. In light of these factors, the
legislature provides an important, but not always proportionate
or direct, counterweight to economically costly rulings, and a
necessary check on judicial activism.
VI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF STORY

In the course of examining Story's impact on bad faith law
in Montana, this Note explored the rise and the fall of the bad
faith claim as a tort. It started with the spread of the bad faith
tort to commercial contracts under Nicholson showing how the
Nicholson court took the final step of allowing the bad faith tort
to sound in any contract claim. Next, it discussed the special
relationship test which the Story court imposed on bad faith
claims to foreclose tort damages in most contract suits, especially
suits between commercial plaintiffs. This Note showed that the
dearth of successful bad faith claims in post-Story case law substantiates the assertion that the Story court intended to foreclose
plaintiffs use of the bad faith tort. Later sections treated parallel
legislative acts showing that UTPAI and WDEA prevent most
bad faith tort claims that might meet the Story special relationship test. In conjunction with these statutes, it is clear that Story ends the reign of Montana's bad faith tort.
Although Story draws to a close Montana's short unification
of contract and tort, it does not represent a triumph in
Montana's contract law, but only a water mark in its ebb and
flow. As the theoretical component of this Note revealed, the
underlying battle over how to compensate breaches of contract
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continues. The economic incentives for plaintiff litigators to expand contract damages beyond the value of the bargain remain
unchanged. As exemplified by Story's second trial award in
which he won $850,000 on pure contract claims, litigators will
exploit other legal avenues to pursue large recoveries.
Moreover, the tug-of-war between parties before the court is
not the only source of tension in the shaping of the law. The
court's shared jurisdiction with the legislature also produces
regulatory competition. Thus, the statutory bans on bad faith not
only reshaped Montana's contract law, but hampered the court's
ability to implement its own normative goals. The discussion of
regulation theory and the legislative history of those bans illustrates that the legislature's lobby-driven process is ill-equipped
to adjudicate economic disputes fairly. However, this Note also
made clear that the economic impact of decisions by the Montana
Supreme Court produced the political backlash that foreclosed
further judicial action through statutory preemption. Therefore,
the most significant conclusion is that courts are better able than
the legislature to adjudicate economic disputes fairly, but that in
order to fulfill properly its duties, the court must consider the
economic ramifications of its decisions on the public.22 °
This Note should also have illustrated that Story has not
solved the underlying problems with Hadley damages, i.e., opportunistic breach and undercompensation, which drove the creation
of the bad faith tort. Therefore, social forces pushing for greater
compensation for contract breach, aided by the economic incentive of plaintiff litigators, will probably reemerge at some point.
Furthermore, if insurers and employers take advantage of the
statutory bans on the bad faith tort to oppress their contractual
counterparts, either the courts will recognize new actions to
address the resulting grievances, or public pressure may drive
the legislature to rescind its bans. It is impossible to predict the
future except to suggest that contract law will remain in a state
of flux. The guidelines to shaping economically rational rulings
afforded here will hopefully aid in creating laws that efficiently
and narrowly accomplish the court's judicial goals.

220. Admittedly, just and economically efficient rulings may still run afoul of
vested business interests that will push for protective and biased legislation.
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